

Seminar Experimental Conflict Behaviour

Jun.-Prof. Gerald Eisenkopf/Prof. Dr. Gerald Schneider

Experiments enjoy a rich tradition in economics and political science. This also holds true for the analysis of conflict. However, most social scientific research has not been sufficiently cumulative, as the workhorse models on which the experiments are based differ greatly across disciplines. In economics, the analytical frameworks employed are mainly contest models and public good games, while political scientists largely rely on crisis bargaining and deterrence models. This seminar, co-taught by an economist and a political scientist, will bring these two strands of literature together and lead to the development of joint experiments. Students will be encouraged to participate in the preparation of the experiments and the articles that will be written based on them.

Participants are expected to summarize the literature on a specific game in a presentation to the entire class and to participate in designing novel experiments. They will write a paper which reflects their participation in the design and conduct of the conflict experiments.

We will open the seminar to two advanced Master's students from both economics and political science. In order to participate, please confirm your interest in participating in this class until March 29, 2012, through a letter to both seminar leaders.

Literature

Klaus Abbink. 2012. Laboratory Experiments on Conflict. In Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict*. Oxford University Press, New York.

Klaus Abbink, Jordi Brandts, Benedikt Herrmann, and Henrik Orzenn. 2010. Intergroup Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game. *American Economic Review* 100(1), 420-447.

Andreas Leibbrandt and Lauri Sääksvuori 2012. Communication in intergroup conflicts. *European Economic Review* 56(6): 1136-1147.

McDermott, Rose 2011 New Directions for Experimental Work in International Relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 55: 503-520.

Matthias Sutter, Christina Strassmair 2009. Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments: an experimental study. *Games and Economic Behavior* 66(1): 506-525.

Dustin H. Tingley and Stephanie W. Wang. 2010. Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5: 243-255.

Dustin H. Tingley 2011. The Dark Side of the Future: An Experimental Test of Commitment Problems in Bargaining. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55, 521-544.

Type of Exam: presentation / research paper.

Time and room to be announced.