

Core Concepts in International Relations (Graduate School in Decision Science/Doctoral Programme Political Science)

This class exposes students to the core concepts used in current theoretical reasoning on international relations. To this end, we will read some recent game-theoretical articles and go through the mathematical proofs from which the authors derived the equilibrium predictions. Note that this class is not a substitute for a proper introduction to game theory. However, it will allow you to read and understand theoretical claims made in the advance literature; such articles are published in AJPS, APSR, ISQ, IO and some other outlets. We will focus on a range of topics (armed conflict, alliances, terrorism, trade, international negotiations etc.).

Students are expected to write a research paper of between 7000 and 9000 words (appendices excluded). The outline of the paper has to be presented in the last session of the class, a first draft is due March 15, 2013, and a second and final version by April 30, 2013. Note that these deadlines are not negotiable.

Requirements:

- 1) Presentation of a formal proof included in a research article of your own choice
- 2) Presentation of research design for your term paper
- 3) Research paper

8/11/2012 (10:00-12:00, D351): *Introduction*

6/12/2012 (9:00-16:00, D351): *Decision/Game Theory*

The morning session will introduce the main theoretical tools. We will go through the appendix of Schneider/Cederman in the afternoon.

Required reading:

- 1) James D. Morrow. *Game Theory for Political Scientists*. Princeton: PUP.
- 2) Charles H. Anderton and John R. Carter 2009. *Principles of Conflict Economics*. Cambridge: CUP, Chapters 2-4.
- 3) Gerald Schneider/Lars-Erik Cederman 1994. The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration. *International Organization* 48(4):633–662.

31/1/2013 (9:00-16:00, D351): *International Conflict*

We will go through the required reading in the morning. The presentations of the related literature is scheduled for the afternoon session.

Required reading:

- 1) Charles H. Anderton and John R. Carter 2009. *Principles of Conflict Economics*, remaining chapters.
- 2) Robert Powell. 2002. Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 1–30.
- 3) Andrew H. Kydd 2010. Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution. *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 101-121

14/2/2013 (9:00-16:00, D351): *IPE and IO*

We will go through the required reading in the morning. The presentations of the related literature is scheduled for the afternoon session.

Required reading:

- 1) Michael J. Gilligan and Leslie Johns 2012. Formal Models of International Institutions. *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 221-243.
- 2) Gerald Schneider, Daniel Finke, and Stefanie Bailer. 2010. Bargaining power in the European Union: An evaluation of competing game-theoretic models. *Political Studies* 58(1): 85–103.
- 3) Christopher K. Butler 2004. Modeling Compromise at the International Table. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21(3):159-177.

21/2/2013 (9:00-16:00, D431): *Presentation of research designs*